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F aIling Everywhere 
Postmodern Politics and American Cultural 
Mythologies 
History repeats itself, endlessly and sometimes tiresomely. 
Numerous writers and scholars have woqied abo~t the divisions -
social, political and cultural '-which began permeating American 
society in the 1960s. The unravelling of America, the coming apart 
of America, became familiar refrains. During the 'sixties itself, 
Daniel Boorstin's new left barbarians were at the gate threatening the 
very, genius of American politics which Boorstin had postulated in the 
previous decade. l This genius, itself a cousin of American 
eXl::eptionalism, revolved around the erosion of ideological division, 
, and the l~ck of vigorous difference within the American polity. 
Rather than 'this producing a bland one dimensionality, it guaranteed 
the preservation of liberty, of individual freedom. Individuality and 
commonality, far from being somewhat contradictory forces, fed off 
each other, securing a happy consensus. This was pure mythology, of 
1. D. Boorstin, 'The New Barbarians: The Decline of Radicalism', in, his The Decline of 
Radicalism: RefleCtions of America Today, New York, Random House, 1969, pp. Pl-34; The 
Genius of American Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
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course, which isnot to suggest there were no elements of truth in it, 
but rather' that Boorstin's analysis was· ideologically self-serving and 
more than a little immodest. The genius of 'the genius of American> 
politics' was that it masked profound divisions, dislocations and 
disorders by inventing an ideal political community un mediated by 
class, race, gender or ideology; a dream world whi"h functioned as 
the intellectual version of a mass culture myth propagated in many 
forms (one for instance, being the televised ideal family, untroubled 
by external disorder or real internal division). And it is mass 
culture, more than commentaries like Boorstin's, which has cemented 
certain neces~ary national myths but these myths have resonance within 
intellectual life and serve to obscure the flipside of capitalist success. 
For American liberals, capitalism has nourished the individual and 
valued individual freedom. Yet for the eloquent German sociologist 
Werner Sombart, the lessQn of American. exceptiona;lism was 
different. Writing in the first decade of this century he observed that 
in America 'one's financial property and income [forms] the basis of 
how one is evaluated. Feeling for the unmeasurable uniqueness of 
personality and for the essence of the indiv:idual disappears'. 2 The 
cash nexus, commodity fetishism and consequent reification (not 
Sombart's words but his .implications) underpinned social life in 
America. Yet Sombart also acknowledged the relatively privileged 
position of the '(white) worker in the American public domain - the 
trappings of class had all but disappeared, so too had class 
consciousness, as high standards of living and educational opportunity 
narrowed (or so it seemed) social distances. A degree of social 
homogeneity unthinkable in Europe prevailed in the States and this 
provided the foundations foJ," civic cohesion. National consensus, 
civic cohesion and s0cial homogeneity all informed Daniel Bell's 
much later 'end of ideology' thesis, penned just before the revival of 
bitter ideological conflict in America.3 More recently, however, 
Bell joined a growing chorus wondering about the direction .of 
America. In particular" he referred to 'the sense' of exhaustion 
[marking] i~tellectual life' and 'the unravelling of the middle class'. 
'The economic foundation for culture', he concluded, 'is beginning to 
show cracks and that presents a crisis of confidence in the very future 
of society'.4 The withering away of old certainties, the challenge of 
those new to positions of power, the cultural dissolut~on and politic41 
2. W. Somba~c, Wkr is There No Socialism in thi? United States?, New York,> M.E.Sharpe Inc., 
1976 [1906], p. II. 
3. D. Bell, The End of1deology, New York, The Free Press, 1960. 
4. D. Bell, 'The C].Ilture Wars', Quadrant, July-August, 1992, p. 26; see also 1. Kriscol, 
'America's Mysterious Malaise', Times Literary Supplement, 22 May 1992, p. 5. 
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disillusionment, ail combined to signal a warning - the centre do.es 
not hold, perhaps' there no longer is a centre, political correctness 
rules the campuses, multiculturalism has transformed educational 
priorities in dangerous ways and an overwhelming sense of things 
falling apart prevails. All this depends upon a necessary national 
myth, the myth that there used to be a common culture, common 
ideals, a cohesive citizenship, a coherent polity and it is. all now 
coming apart at the seams. To be sure, something is happening Mr 
Jones. A .shift to the postmodern does rupture elements of tradition. 
ltis, however, easy to exaggerate the supposedly splid core of 
American public life. 
Arthur Schlesinger Jnr. celebrates the national identity fostered by 
the United Stanis, 'a brand-new national identity, carried fqrward by 
individuals who, in forsaking old loyalties and ,joining to make new 
life, melted away ethnic differences'.5 Americanization was a 
triumph of American exceptionalism,. removing group allegiances" 
tribal loyalties and making the many into the one. Now, however, 
identity is up for grabs and American identity is just one among 
many. Schlesinger worries that 'the cult of ethnicity' has as its 
'underlying philosophy' the idea 'that America· is not a nation of 
individuals at all but a nation of groups'.6 In reality, it was the cult . 
of liberilJ historiography which, being blind to collective identities, 
reproduced the myth ·of individualism and individu~ity. To think 
that black sharecroppers in Alabama were 'a bunch of individu?ls', 
just like the 'bunch of individuals' who were longshoremen in San 
Francisco, or the 'bunch of individuals' who sat in executive rooms on 
Fifth Avenue. This is the intellectual variation on a theme developed 
by ~ass culture. American television depended upo~ and helped 
reproduce the myth that, to use the words of Todd Gitlin, 'we're all 
folks', underneath everything we're all the same 7 - this folksiness 
protects itself from. the world of difference (even if it acknowledges 
difference - token blacks, token workers) by standardizing and. 
homogenizing, .by creating a one dimensional world where 'the 
essence of the individual disappears' but the myth of the individual 
remains. So too, Schlesinger's individuals should have one dominant 
collective identity - the American identity - and that is why what 
is pu,t in the educational curriculum is .so important: 'The debate 
about the curriculum is· a debate about what it means to be an 
S. A. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, New 
York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1992, p. 13. 
6. Schlesinger, p. 16. 
7. T. Gitlin, interviewed on Th.e Truth About Lies: The Tube' is Reality, a Panopticon 
Production for Channel Four (England), 1991. 
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me.ncan. I et, as Michael Walzer has argued, that meaning was 
;md IS far from ~bs~lut~.9 Indeed, Walzer suggests that rather than a 
coherent Amencamsm, there has always been a 'decentered' n t' 
c· L. , a lon, 
an lI~con~re~ce. He further argues that 'a radical program of 
AmencamzatlOn would really be un-American' .10 There is a t f· . . Wal ' no eo 
lrony.m zer ~ use of the term 'un-American' but it still reflects a 
peculiarly Amencan way of viewing things (as Boorstin amongst 
~the:s, has recognized).ll Moreover, he seems to underes;imate the 
slgmficance of A~ericanization. Like so many scholars he is . 
relu~tant todemomze mass cll;lture and .thus leaves it floating as a 
belllgn popular culture which enshnnes a certain sort of 
~mericanness.12 Never~heless, informed by Walzer's perspective, the 
hbe~al and conservauvearguments concerning the educational 
c~mc.ulum and how much it should embody racial and ethnic 
dIverSIty, take on .a diff:renr meaning ~ they deny historical reality 
and rely upon the mventlOn of a mythical oneness. . 
For Schlesinger, as for Bell and many others the national mood has 
c~a~ged. '~aning American optimism' reflects a national psyche in 
criSIS, propeUmg people to look back rather than forward. Instead of 
cheering ?n this revival of historical memory,· the liberal historian 
bemoans Its tendency to detract from the American futures market 13 
?he ris~ng cult of,ethnic~ty is a symptom of deer easing confidenc'e' 
m AmerIca ... and today 1t threatens to become a counter-revolution 
against the. original. the~ry of America as "one people", a common 
cultu.re, a sm~le natlOrt. 14 The myth of commonality runs alongside 
the lIberal faith in progress. It was in the 1960s that this liberal-
teleology was questioned vigorously and it is, of course, to the 1960s 
tha~ ~cholars like Schlesinger trace the roots of today's tribalism and 
po.hucal' correctness. American identity, so the story now goes, is 
?emg ~ractu.red by ethnic groups claiming the world as their own and 
mven:mg ~I~tory in their own image. Identity politics certainly did 
have Its OrIgIns m the 1960s, but its central role in radi<;:alism is a 
post-1960s phenomenon. Indeed, there is a sense in which the rise of 
identity politics signalled the withering away of the new left's search 
for community. .:. 
8, Schlesinger, p. 17. 
9. M. Walzer, 'What Does it Mean to Be an "American"?' Social Research vol 57 3 Fall 
1990, p. 591-614. " . , no. , 
10. Walzer, p. 614. 
11. Boorstin, p. 14. 
12. Walzer, p. 606-7. 
13. Schlesinger, p. 41. 
14. Schlesinger, pp. 41, 43. 
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Like Schlesinger, Robert Hughes trots out a few tired old 
falsehoods about the 'sixties and he also relies upon th~ same sort of-
national myth {there once was a solid coherent whole, but it's now 
falling apart or,. to use his term 'fraying').15 With the rect!nt end of 
the Cold War, Hughes argues, a plethora of issues constructs the 
political and a 'sense of common citizenship dissolved'.!6 We could 
be forgiven for thinking this is all for the good if common 
citizenship is the same as mindless patriotism, but Hughes is 
referring to a process of depoliticization. He fails to recognize that 
the process began much earlier than the 1970s and 1980s and is very 
much bound up with the nature of contemporary liberal capitalism.!? 
These' days depoliticization is fuelled by the constant claims that· 
Marxism is dead .. So it comes as no surprise when Hughes asserts 
'Marxism is dead; that part of history is over'.!8 Waxing lyrical 
about depoliticization, he gives it another nudge along. ' .. 
Hughes deplores the attempt to create artificial nationality out of 
cultural, racial or sexual difference ('Queer nation, indeed')19 but he 
fails to find something peculiarly American in all of. this. The 
postmodern national myths emerging from identity politics share 
much in common with the myth of America. The oc;:casionally 
overblown claims generated by a politics of identity can, in part, be 
seen as a product of a mass mediated age in which the need for myth 
is ever more apparent. As the America of Boorstin and Sch~esinger, 
itself a myth, appears. to disintegrate, why not ~eplace one national 
. myth with another when politics in America today involves the 
. reproduction of simulacrum? This to be sure, is an exaggeration, but 
the demands for separatism and claims of nationhood are desperate 
pleas which rely upon mythologies which hardly negate the dominant 
culture. Indeed, mythologies of identity and difference· actually 
mirror the mythologies of unity and sameness. And identity politics 
can and does, as Robert Hughes argues, fuel a culture of victims. 
Joel Schumacher's film Falling Down provides a cogent 
commentary on both victim-culture and the argument that there was 
once a: coherent whole, a real America which is now falling apart . 
(hence the title,' to my mind deliberately ironic). A man, clearly 
suffering from stress and mental anguish, leaves his car during a 
traffic jam o~ a Los Angeles freeway and walks away determinedly. 
15. R. Hughes, Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
16. Hughes, p. 36. 
17. See A. Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism, 
New York, The Free Press, 1977, p. 288-321. 
18. Hughes, p. 73. 
19. Hughes, p. 75. 
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'Where do you think you're going', yells one angry driver. 'I'm 
going home' replies the man. Home here functions as a metaphor for 
America, the idealized America of Hollywood, of billboard 
advertisements, a u.nited America. undisturbed by class, race, 
et~nicity and gender. The man, played by Michael Douglas, is 
trymg to get home to that America, but also trying to get to his real 
home. But there no longer is.a 'real' home because his wife, with 
child in tow, left him due to his supposed violent propensities. We 
learn that the Douglas character (known mainly as D-Fens, after his 
car's numberplate), has lost his job in the defence industry, a job in 
the belly of the beast. He is another victim, only this time he 
personifies the white, male, middle class 'victim' of the 1980s. . 
, Surrounded by independent women and fanatical minorities, 
besieged by both social. processes of urban decay and mounting 
violence, and by economic processes of restructuring and 
. internationalization, the world of the white, middle class male is 
coming apart. He is the real victim today, a victim, in part, of all 
those who claim victim status. Or at least, that is how many 
audiences and critics viewed the filmmaker's intentions 
Schumacher, however, does not endorse or legitimIze the Dougla~ 
character. Rather, he develops a critique of current American society 
and a critique of the mythologies which have sustained America in 
the past but are finally unravelling. Unlike Schlesinger and Hughes, 
Schumacher knows that it is American mythologies as well as' 
American society which are 'falling down'. Apparently. audiences In 
America cheered when D-Fens assaulted a Korean 'store owner, 
trashed his store and then confronted and literally blew away Latino 
gang members. Schumacher's film, however, is a black comedy and 
a disturbing one. It allows you at one level to identify with D-Fens. 
Yet the actions of D-Fens are not defended or glamorized. At times' 
standard Hollywood action scenes are satirized ruthlessly but it is 
possible to miss the satire. In a superb sequence, D:-Fens arises as a 
sovereign consumer and exercises his 'rights' in a Whammy Burger 
shop. The culture of sanitized mass food production, policed by 
. youthful soulless automatons, has never been captured more 
effectively. We may feel a sneaking admirationfor the way in which 
D-Fens challenges the ethos of Whammy Burgers but part of the pain 
of the film is that you can identify and laugh with a guy who is 
plainly crackers (because the rest of the world isn't far off it anyway). 
This is not just another Hollywood story, a 'Coming Home' type of 
sentimentalism in search of the real America. It resonates with the 
dilemmas of the time and provides a blistering commentary upon 
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Am,erican mythologies in general and Hollywood mythologies in 
particular. 
Paradoxically, a further element of the thesis that America is 
falling apart is provided by those who believe that HollyWood itself 
is betraying real American values. Michael Medved" for instance, 
, sees good old-time ,small-town American values and virtues being 
eroded by a film industry which puts sexual promiscuity, violence, 
cynicism, about religion and patriotism, and anti-Americanism in 
general on a pedesta1.2o The argument that H()llywood films or 
television shows have been, in the main," anti-American over the last 
decade or so (the influence of a generation reared on 'sixties 
radicalism, of course) is hard to sustain. The violence and everything 
else that disturbs Medved is as American as cherlY pie. He is thus 
depending upon, or trying to resuscitate, the notion that the real 
America .is being eroded by values somehow external to it. This 
type of thinking is cold war ideology in a different guise and its 
America is the land of the Walsh family from 90210 or, going' back 
(can you go, further back than the Walsh family?) of Ozzie and 
Harriet. It is the America of Sears Roebuck catalogues and 
wondrous department stores. It is the America oLfrontiers without 
inhabitants and limitless possibilities for those drawn from other 
lands. It is the America untrammeled by ideological politics, which 
is content to pursue pragmatism and in which thrift" inditstry and 
loyalty always payoff. Such myths lie at the core of American mass 
culture and much contemporarycultural'criticism. The sentiment 
that real American PQlitical, cultural and social values are w;ithering 
away under pressure from diverse groups claiming their own 
identities, and at the expense of an American identity, is just another 
version of that cultural mythology. 
'I'm going home,', says D-Fens. Yet there no longer is a home. 
More tellingly, there never was. 
20, M. Medved, Hollywood vs. America, New York, Harper Perennial, 1992. 
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